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In part as a response to the current resurgence of nationalist sentiment in
many parts of the world, several authors have recently sought to revive the legacy
of cosmopolitanism. ' They frequently appeal to eighteenth-century cosmopoli-
tans, especially Immanuel Kant, and to their notions of the moral equality of all
human beings, the existence of a set of human rights, and the urgency of estab-
lishing the political institution of a league of nations. But the full complexity of
eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism has not yet been explored. Defenders and
critics of cosmopolitanism agree that it is a form of universalism. It is the view
that all human beings share certain essential features that unite or should unite
them in a global order that transcends national borders and warrants their desig-
nation as "citizens of the world." But few scholars have examined the precise
content of the various cosmopolitan theories of the time to determine just what
these features are and what form this global order takes. While typologies and
histories of nationalism abound, cosmopolitanism has so far remained largely
unexplored territory.2 At most, one finds a distinction drawn between moral
1 Martha Nussbaum defends a moral version of cosmopolitanism in her "Patriotism and
Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Joshua Cohen
(Boston, 1996), 3-17. For authors such as Thomas Pogge, David Held, and Jurgen Habermas
cosmopolitanism is more clearly a political (rather than or in addition to being a moral) matter.
See Habermas, "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years' Hind-
sight," Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, eds. James Bohman and Matthias
Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 113-53; Held, Democracy and the Global Order:
From the Modem Slate to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, 1995); Pogge, "Cosmopolitan-
ism and Sovereignty," Ethics. 103 (1992), 48-75; also Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and
the Cosmopolitan Alternative," University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 (1992),
751-93.
! Exceptions are the study by Thomas J. Schlereth, The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlighten-
ment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694-1790
(Notre Dame, 1977) and Albert Mathiez, La Révolution et les étrangers: Cosmopolitisme et
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cosmopolitanism, the view that all human beings belong to a single moral com-
munity, and political cosmopolitanism, the attempt to establish a world-wide
legal arid political order. But there are important further distinctions to draw, for
both historical and contemporary purposes.
In this paper I present a segment of the history of cosmopolitanism by focus-
sing on late eighteenth-century German cosmopolitan theory (roughly, 1780-
1800).3 During this relatively brief period the public debate about cosmopolitan-
ism, nationhood, and patriotism intensified enormously and led to a wider spec-
trum of positions than elsewhere, until around the turn of the century, national-
ism became dominant and the cosmopolitan voices died down. Since then this
debate has not been the subject of very much research.4
The central aim of this paper is to show that in late eighteenth-century Ger-
many cosmopolitanism was not a single encompassing idea but rather came in at
least six different varieties: moral cosmopolitanism; proposals for reform of the
international political and legal order; cultural cosmopolitanism, which empha-
sizes the value of global cultural pluralism; economic cosmopolitanism, which
aims at establishing a global free market where all humans are equal potential
trading partners; and the romantic cosmopolitan ideal of humanity as united by
faith and love. These six kinds of cosmopolitanism are by no means mutually
exclusive, and I shall clarify the relationships among them.
By highlighting these six different versions of cosmopolitanism I do not
mean to suggest that cosmopolitanism was the only or even the dominant view in
Germany at the time. It was a significant and respectable view, however, de-
fended by such influential authors as Kant and Wieland; and it remained so until
the intellectual climate grew increasingly nationalist in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. I do not, however, attempt to provide a historical explanation of the rise
and fall of cosmopolitanism during these two decades. Obviously, any such ex-
planation would include reference to the fact that Germany was not a nation-
state, but a precise historical account lies beyond the scope of this essay. I focus
instead on the different incarnations of the idea of cosmopolitanism.
defense nationale (Paris, 1918). But Mathiez discusses only French cosmopolitanism, and
Schlereth focusses on cosmopolitanism as a form of life and on what different cosmopolitans
had in common, rather than on cosmopolitan theories and the differences between them. Karen
O'Bnen's valuable study, Narratives of Enlightenment.- Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to
Gibbon (Cambridge, 1997), focuses on the idea of a European civilization and as such does not
discuss cosmopolitanism in the sense in which the term is used in this essay.
1 I do not discuss the history of the word and its various meanings, which range from
"traveler" to "traitor," from "freemason" to "francophile."
' The only general discussions of German cosmopolitanism are found in works with a
nationalist bias. See Edmund Pfleiderer, Kosmopolitisme und Patriotisms (Berlin, 1874)
and Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and ike National State, tr. Robert B. Kimber




Moral cosmopolitanism is the view that all human beings are members of a
single moral community and that they have moral obligations to all other human
beings regardless of their nationality, language, religion, customs, etc. Its de-
fenders regard all humans as worthy of equal moral concern and advocate im-
partiality and tolerance. Within this broad definition, moral cosmopolitanism
can take different forms, depending on how one views the nature of morality.
The root form of this view is the cosmopolitanism of the ancient Cynics and
the Stoics. While for the Cynics, cosmopolitanism was more a critique of paro-
chialism than a positive theory, the Stoics developed it into an articulate moral
doctrine. In their view all humans deserve our respect and moral recognition,
because they share with us a common rationality and moral capacity. All human
beings should be regarded as "fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch) regard-
less of their national, ethnic, religious, or other particular affiliations. This talk
of world citizenship should be read metaphorically, however, because the Stoics
did not go so far as to propose reforms of the existing political world order. It
refers to moral "citizenship" in a moral community rather than to political citi-
zenship in a transnational state.5
This ancient metaphorical notion of moral citizenship is central in much of
eighteenth-century German moral cosmopolitanism. A good representative is
Christoph Martin Wieland ( 1733-1813).6 As novelist and editor of the Teutsche
Merkur, a leading vehicle for the German Enlightenment, Wieland was one of
the most influential German intellectuals in the last quarter of the eighteenth
century. He acquired the reputation of being a cultivated, moderate, reasonable,
and tolerant man, yet one who was able to chastise with ridicule and biting
sarcasm what he saw as old and new irrationalisms: the old forces of despotism
and superstition and the new forces of an emerging German nationalism.
Wieland made cosmopolitanism the explicit theme of a series of essays in
the 1780s, most notably, "Das Geheimnifi des Kosmopoliten-Ordens" (1788). In
Wieland's view cosmopolitans strive to promote the well-being of all humans,
wherever they may be. Not affected by partiality or prejudice, they strive "to
reduce the sum of evils that weigh upon humanity, insofar as they can do this
! See Eric Brown, Stoic Cosmopolitanism and the Political Life (Ph.D. Diss., University
of Chicago, 1997).
' See Irmtraut Sahmland, Christoph Martin Wieland and die deutsche Nation: Zwischen
Patriotisms, Kosmopolitismus and Griechentum (Tubingen, 1990), and Frederick C. Beiser,
Enlightenment. Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought
1790-1800 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 335-62; also Johan van der Zande, "In the Image of
Cicero: German Philosophy between Wolff and Kant," JH1, 56 (1995), 419-42.
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without wreaking havoc themselves, and to increase the sum of the good in the
world, as well as they can."7 Wieland writes:
The cosmopolitans carry the designation citizens of the world in the
most authentic and eminent sense. They regard all peoples of the earth
as just so many branches ofa single family, and the universe as a state,
in which they [the cosmopolitans] are citizens, together with innumer-
able other rational beings, in order to promote the perfection of the whole.8
Here, as with the Stoics, the world is metaphorically "regarded as" a state in
which all human beings are citizens. Wieland does not propose any radical re-
forms of the international political landscape. Rather, moral cosmopolitanism
consists in fulfilling one's moral duty as best as one can.
Yet Wieland's moral cosmopolitanism is not apolitical or even antipohtical.
While it does not include recommendations for reshaping the international po-
litical world order, it does entail political duties, insofar as morality provides
guidelines for one's actions in one's capacity as citizen or politician. Wieland's
view is that one should promote reforms to abolish social and moral wrongs,
whether they be within or outside one's national borders. He himself, for ex-
ample, regards it as his cosmopolitan duty to appeal publicly to the French
national assembly in hopes of convincing the French to change their course by
paying more respect to the monarchy and going less far in the direction of radi-
cal democracy ("Kosmopolitische Addresse an die französische Nazional-
versammlung," October 1789). Thus, even though he does not propose an alter-
native to the existing world order, he does think cosmopolitanism implies moral
action aimed at improving the situation abroad.9
But for Wieland all cosmopolitan efforts should aim at reforms, not revolu-
tion. Not brute force but the rational force of the better argument is what prom-
ises to yield long-lasting and beneficial results without the dangerous side-ef-
fects of revolutions. The best strategy for cosmopolitans is to use "the weapons
of reason."10
Wieland does not conceive of morality as providing a clear and sharp blue-
print for action or a set of readily applicable principles. Rather, moral cosmo-
politanism requires us to judge each situation in context. The true cosmopolitan
is the sage, the person who has grown wise through experience and reflection
and who knows what is most reasonable to do in given circumstances.
' Wielands Gesammelte Schriften, éd. Deutsche Kommission der Preussischen Akademie
der Wisschenschaften (Berlin, I909-), XV, 216.
' Sahmland (264-66) mischaracterizes Wieland's cosmopolitanism as politically passive
and merely a matter of individual self-development; Beiser (349-50) argues against such a
quietistic interpretation of Wieland's political philosophy.
' Wielands Gesammelte Schriften, XV, 212-13.
"Ibid., XV, 219.
Cosmopolitanism in Germany
The emphasis on the sage points to an elitist element in Wieland's moral
cosmopolitanism, an element he shares with many Stoics. While he conceives of
the scope of the action of cosmopolitans as universal, he does not hold that all
humans are cosmopolitans. In fact Wieland draws a distinction between "world
dwellers" and "world citizens": only sages are world citizens, and the vast ma-
jority of people are mere world dwellers."
But this elitism is not a necessary element of moral cosmopolitanism.
Immanuel Kant, for example, defends a version of moral cosmopolitanism ac-
cording to which all humans are regarded as "citizens" of a moral community, as
"citizen[s] of a supersensible world."12 Kant also rejects the idea that one needs
special wisdom to discern what is morally demanded. He holds that ordinary
human beings are usually perfectly able to do so (even if they do not always act
accordingly).
Moral cosmopolitans differ on the question of whether all humans qualify as
citizens of the moral community and on the nature of morality. But they agree on
the moral equality of all humans as objects of moral concern, and on the con-
comitant ideal of impartiality. Although they see our moral duties as extending
beyond national borders, this does not by itself commit them to a political ideal
of a reshaped world order. But as I show in the next section, some moral cosmo-
politans also defend such a political ideal. They give the phrase "world citizen-
ship" a literal sense by aiming at a world-wide legal and political order that
unites all human individuals into one political body. This view constitutes politi-
cal cosmopolitanism, which comes in two versions, as discussed in the next two
sections.
International Federative Cosmopolitanism
Some late eighteenth-century philosophers add to their moral cosmopolitan-
ism a political theory advocating a federation of states. The idea of such a fed-
eration was not new, as there are well-known older proposals, for example, the
Abbé de Saint Pierre's Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe (1713-
6). But whereas many peace proposals, like that of the Abbé, have an explicit
focus on Europe only, the cosmopolitan proposals have a world-wide scope.
Although such authors as Kant, Fichte, and Schlegel attribute a special status to
Europe as the crystallization point for their envisioned new world order, their
ultimate scope is global.
International federative cosmopolitanism comes in weak and strong ver-
sions, where "weak" and "strong" refer to the degree of the internal cohesion of
the federation of states required by the theory. Those who hold the weak view
1 1 Ibid,, XV, 214.
12 Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden in Kants Gesammelle Schriften (Berlin, 1902- ),
VIII, 350 n. Hereafter ZeF, followed by volume and page.
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advocate the formation of a league of states without coercive powers (Kant);
those who hold the strong view advocate either the establishment of a league
with the authority to enforce federal law (Fichte) or the romantic ideal of a non-
coercive democratic world republic of republics (Schlegel). Both weak and strong
versions involve the continued existence of a plurality of states.To my knowl-
edge, no one in Germany defended the more radical ideal of the abolishment of
all existing states and the establishment of a single world state under which all
human individuals would be directly subsumed. This ideal was defended in France
by Anacharsis Cloots (Jean-Baptiste du Val-de-Grace, baron de Cioots, 1755-
94). Prussian by birth, self-proclaimed citizen of the world, and living in Paris
during the French revolutionary years, Cloots rose to fame and power in the
Jacobin movement by advocating a single, world-encompassing "republic of
united individuals."13
Kant adds to his moral cosmopolitanism a cosmopolitan political theory. He
started out defending the strong view and only later modified it into the weak
position. In his essay, "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher
Absicht" (1784), Kant advocates a "cosmopolitan situation" that would arise if
states formed a federation "similar to a civil commonwealth"14 and submit them-
selves to common laws and a common authority to enforce these laws. He calls
such a league a "great political body," in which every member state receives its
security and its rights from a "united power and from decisions in accordance
with the laws of a united will."15
Later, in Zum ewigen Frieden and the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant still
argues that states ought to submit to common laws by joining a league of states
that promotes peace. " But he no longer argues that the league should have coer-
cive power to enforce those laws. He now advocates allowing states to retain
their full independence and requires only that they comply with the laws volun-
tarily. He becomes less optimistic regarding the possibility of the complete real-
ization of peace. He rejects the establishment of a "state of states" as conceptu-
ally incoherent. Many states within one state would form only one state, abol-
ishing the statehood of these states in their act of joining. "
1 ' See La république universelle ou adresse aux tyrannicides (1792); Bases constitutionelles
de la république du genre humain (1793). In Anacharsis Cloots, Oeuvres (3 vols., Munich,
1980), III.
" ZeF, VIII, 25.
15 Ibid., 24, 28.
" Ibid., 356. See James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace:
Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); Volker Bialas and Hans-
Jürgen HSSler (eds.), 200Jahre Rants Entwurf'Zum ewigen Frieden " (Würzburg, 1996); Otfried
Höffe (éd.), Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden (Berlin, 1995); Klaus-Michael Kodalle (éd.),
Der Vemunfifrieden: Kanis Entwurf im Wlderstreii (Würzburg, 1996); Reinhard Merkei and
Roland Wittmann (eds.), Zum ewigen Frieden: Grundlage, Aktualitat und Aussichten einer
Idee von Jmmanuel Kant (Frankfurt am Main, 1996).
17 ZeF, VU!, 354-55, 367.
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But this reason for rejecting the strong position has often been criticized as
inconsistent. His critics point out that his argument is invalid because it neglects
the possibility that states transfer only part of their sovereignty to the federal
level, namely, only the part regarding their relations to each other, while retain-
ing sovereignty in internal affairs. Thus, some of the early reviewers of Zum
ewigen Frieden attack Kant's view on the league of nations, most notably Fichte
and Schlegel.'8 They argue that the only consistent position for Kant to defend is
that we should strive for the establishment of a state of states with coercive
power (Fichte) or a non-coercive republic of republics (Schlegel). Like Kant
they oppose the formation of a single world-state to which all individuals on
earth would be directly subsumed, but they argue for a stronger form of interna-
tional union than does Kant.19
In his review Fichte regards the league of states as merely an intermediate
stage on the way to a state of states (Volkerstaat).2" Just as local alliances for
mutual protection preceded the formation of states, he says, the league (Bund)
can precede the formation of the state of states.21 States ought to join a "state of
nations [states], in which conflicts are adjudicated in accordance with positive
laws,"22 because there is no other means to end warfare. In the Grundlage des
Naturrechts, also published in 1796, Fichte drops the talk of a "state" of states
in favor of "league." He supports this by saying that states should not be forced
to join this federation, which is better conveyed by the term "league."23 But his
essential difference with Kant remains in Fichte's insistence that this league should
have coercive powers. Member states in the league ought to recognize each
other through treaties, regard each other as equals, and treat each other's citi-
zens lawfully. In Fichte's view, if one state violates a treaty or refuses to recog-
nize another state, this is ground for war. But because the power of individual
states does not necessarily correspond to how much they are in the right, it is the
task of the league "to destroy with united powers that state—be it part of the
league or not—which does not recognize the independence of one of [the mem-
ber states], or which breaks a treaty that exists between one of [them] and it-
self."24 Thus, the league must be in a position to enforce its legal judgments
through war and be armed or have die option to arm itself when necessary.
" See also Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Rechte ader-
der positiven Gesetzgebung: Ein Versuch über die ersten Gründe des Naturrechts (Züllichau,
1796), 159-62.
" See also Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, "Kant's Idea of Peace and the Philosophical Concep-
tion of a World Republic," in Perpetual Peace, 59-77.
10 On Fichte's cosmopolitanism, see Ives Radrizzani, "1st Fichtes Modell des Kosmopolitis-
mus pluralistisch?" Fichte-Studien, 2 (1990), 7-19.
11 Fichtes Werke, éd. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin, 1971), VIII, 433.
22 Ibid.
B Fichtes Werke, III, 380.
» Ibid, 379.
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This raises the question of what ensures that a Fichtean league of states will
be just. Fichte in fact concedes that it is not possible to prove that the league will
be just but only that it makes unjust outcomes of war less likely. This concession
shows, however, that his prediction that a league with coercive power will bring
about perpetual peace is less than fully justified.25
Friedrich Schlegel, too, argues that it is possible to conceive of a state of
states without all individual states merging into one.26 He begins his criticism of
Kant by considering the role that empirical assumptions play in Kant's allegedly
pure political theory. Kant assumes, says Schlegel, that humans will never act
fully in accordance with the moral law and this assumption grounds the coercive
authority of the state. But this assumption is merely empirical and as such is not
necessarily true: "The opposite is at least conceivable." Therefore, a truly pure
concept of the state should not depend on the assertion that people will act against
the law. This in turn means that the ideal state cannot include "political power
and dependence,"27 for these are introduced into the concept of the state only
because of the assumption that people violate the law. "Therefore, not every
state includes the relationship between a superior and a subordinate, but only the
state that is empirically determined by that actual fact." The ideal state, then—
that is, the state as conceived in abstraction from any factual human flaws is a
state in which there is total equality: a state of "absolute equality of rights and
obligations of the citizens of the state," which "puts an end to all power and
dependence."28
Schlegel goes on to argue that the same argument that leads to the ideal ot
the non-authoritarian state also applies to the relationship between different states.
It is possible to conceive of a state of states that does not include the relationship
of power and dependence, that is, a society of states that is characterized by the
freedom and equality of all individual members (states). This would be a non-
coercive republic of republics, which he calls a "world republic." By this he
means neither a single republic into which all other states merge by giving up
their independence nor a state of states with coercive powers. Rather, it is a non-
hierarchical, fraternal commonwealth of free and equal republics.-9 Because these
republics are united by obeying common laws and by a strong fraternal bond,
Schlegel's ideal of a republic of republics qualifies as a version of international
federative cosmopolitanism.
From Kantian and Fichtean perspectives, however, Schlegel's objection to
granting the state and the world republic coercive powers misses the mark. In
25 Cf. Johann Adam Bergk, Briefe über Immanuet Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgninde
der Recfttslehre, enthaltend Erlauteningen, Priifiing and Einwûrfe (Leipzig, 1 797).
26 "Versuch über der Begriff des Repufalikanismus" in Knnsche Friedrich-SMegel-
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the Metaphysik der Sitten, perhaps e ven in response to Schlegel, Kant points out
that it is "not experience" that necessitates the coercive powers of the state, but
merely the possibility that people will violate each other's spheres of freedom. In
Kant's own view—a view also endorsed by Fichte—this possibility is implicit in
the very concept of freedom.30
Despite their disagreement over the character of the federation of states,
however, international federative cosmopolitans agree on the importance of es-
tablishing peace among states and on the necessity of radically reforming how
states interact in order to achieve peace.
International federative cosmopolitanism is not the only form of political
cosmopolitanism. In addition, some authors defend the normative validity of a
particular set of human rights, which Kant terms "cosmopolitan rights." Kant is
most likely the first to have introduced the category of cosmopolitan law as a
special category of public law; and it had some prominence, especially in Kantian
circles, until the early nineteenth century. Although authors defending cosmo-
politan law usually also defend a version of international federative cosmopoli-
tanism, the reverse is not true. Therefore, I discuss the two as different types of
cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitan Law
According to the traditional view held by Kant, international law is the law
between states. In contrast cosmopolitan law regulates the interaction between
states and individuals of foreign states insofar as their interaction is not regu-
lated by legitimate treaties between those states.31 The core of cosmopolitan law
(Weltbürgerrecht) is that states and individuals have the right to attempt to es-
tablish relations with other states and their citizens, but not a right to enter
foreign territory. States have the right to refuse visitors, but not violently and not
if doing so results in their death.32
Cosmopolitan law is concerned with international commerce in the broadest
sense, including any kind of communication, interaction, trade, or business across
borders. It applies to travel, emigration, and intellectual exchange as well as to
commercial endeavors. The content of cosmopolitan law is the right to "hospi-
tality." This hospitality right is defined negatively, as "the right of a stranger not
to be treated with hostility because of his arrival on someone else's soil."33 It is
merely a right to visit, which Kant understands as the right to present oneself
M Kant, MdS, VI, 312; cf. Ficfttes Werke, IE, 92-95.
11 See Reinhard Brandt, "Vom Weltbürgerrecht," in Höffe, Immanuel Kant. 133-48, and
my "Kani's Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order," Kantian Review, 2
(1998), 72-90.
32 ZeF, VIII, 358.
» Ibid.
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and to try to establish contacts with people and states in other parts of the world.
Thus, the term "hospitality right" does not imply a right to be treated as a guest.
A state has the right to deny a visit as long as it does so by peaceful means * As
Kant puts it in Zum ewigen Frieden: strangers have a right of "approach," not
"entry" ("Zugang" not "EingangV' They do not have a general right to be
supported, to be taken in, or to be tolerated by a foreign state any longer than i
takes them to turn around and leave.
This implies that no one has a right to settle on the soil of another people,
except when permitted through a treaty. Much of Kant's discussion of cosmo-
politan law is a strong critique of colonialism. Moreover, in rejecting a right to
settle on another people's soil, Kant stands out amidst eighteenth-century phi-
losophers who discuss the question whether "savages" are capable of forming
treaties at all. Any human being is the potential subject of covenants and the
bearer of certain basic rights.36
Limiting the content of cosmopolitan law to the right to hospitality seems t.
make it very limited indeed, but in fact the implications of this right are quite
significant. It is not clear whether Kant intends this, but here he defends a right
that under certain circumstances is even broader than a right to political asylum,
including protection from starvation and from fatal disease. He argues than»
state is permitted to refuse a visitor only "when it can happen without his death,"37
which implies that whenever refusing a person at the border is impossible with-
out the person being killed, admission is obligatory. There are places in the
Nachlass where Kant draws this implication by mentioning that people who are
forced by circumstances outside their control to arrive on another state's terri-
tory should be allowed to stay at least until the circumstances are favorable for
their return. He gives the example of sailors on a ship seeking refuge from a
storm, thus in effect stating that cosmopolitan law implies the right to a safe
haven" Thus Kant's conception of cosmopolitan law contains the building blocks
for a justification of many of the refugee rights that have been established in the
twentieth century.39
In the Grundlage des Naturrechts, published between Kant's Zum ewigen
Frieden and the Metaphysik der Sitter,, Fichte takes over Kant's concept of
cosmopolitan law but transforms its content into the most basic human right—
the right to have and acquire rights: All positive rights are grounded in a specific
treaty. Strangers, upon arrival on foreign territory, have not concluded any trea-
" MdS, VI, 352.
" ZeF, VIII, 359.
» See also Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford, 1983), 260.
37 ZeF, VIII, 358.
31 Kants Gesammeite Schriften, XXII1, 173.
» See my "Kant's Cosmopolitan Law," and on refugee rights, Guy S. Goodwra-Gill, She
Refugee in International Law (Oxford, 1996!).
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ties with the state visited or its subjects yet, but that does not mean they have no
rights at all. They have the original human right that antecedes all treaties and
makes them possible: a stranger has "the fight to have all human beings presup-
pose that they can enter into a legal relationship with him through treaties"*"
Cosmopolitan law also includes the conditions for the possibility of requesting
entrance into a legal relationship.41 Therefore, cosmopolitan law includes the
right to travel around freely on the face of the earth. Like Kant, Fichte limits this
right by the provision that states have the right to send strangers away if they do
not want to enter into a relationship with them, as long as they do so non-vio-
lently and without causing their death.42
Not all cosmopolitans with visions of humankind united across the globe
couch their views in political-legal terms, however. Three different approaches
remain to be discussed here. The first is the view that different cultures are all
manifestations of one common humanity. The second is oriented around the idea
of a free world-wide market; and the third, around a globally shared love and
faith.
Cultural Cosmopolitanism
Cultural cosmopolitanism is the view that humanity expresses itself in a rich
variety of cultural forms, that we should recognize different cultures in their
particularity, and that attempts to achieve cultural uniformity lead to cultural
impoverishment. Eighteenth-century cultural cosmopolitans are neither relativ-
ists nor ethnocentrists. They want to have it both ways: they wish to preserve
open-minded engagement with other cultures in a way that takes their particu-
larity seriously, and yet they reject relativism. They do this by grounding the
standard for evaluation in a common humanity that underlies all cultural forms.
The spirit of cultural cosmopolitanism is implicit in many German Enlighten-
ment philosophers ' ardent interest in comparative anthropology and in their self-
understanding as belonging to an impartial, anti-parochial movement that de-
fends the fundamental equality of all human beings.
The best representative of German cultural cosmopolitanism is Georg Forster
(1754-94}." Forster became a well-known naturalist and anthropologist in Ger-
many (and elsewhere) through the publication of his travel reports about his
voyage with Captain Cook (1772-75). His ideal in his description of the cultures
" Kant, Grundlage des Naturrechts in Kanu Gesammelle Schriften, III, 384.
" Ibid.
" See also Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk, PhUosophische Untersuchungen über das Privat-
und öffenlliche Recht zur Erlaulemng and Beunheilung der metaphysischen Anfangsgrunde
der Rechtslehre vom Herm Prof. Immanuel Kant (Halle, 1798), 583-84.
'! Georg Forsiers Werke. ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1958-); and
see Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, 154-85.
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he encountered is to provide a comprehensive, unprejudiced account of each of
them. He is interested not in gathering collections of curiosities but rather in a
systematic investigation of the individual character of each culture as a whole.
He investigates not only the material aspects of cultures (from clothing to house-
hold items to weapons) but also their social and political structure, religion,
morals, and other customs.
Forster's main idea, expressed in later theoretical essays, is that all humans
share the same essential natural predispositions (Anlagen) for reason, feeling,
and imagination; but that these predispositions have developed differently in
different regions of the world, depending on external circumstances, thus lead-
ing to different cultures. In "Über lokale und allgemeine Bildung" (1791) he
says:
What man [der Mensch] could become, he has everywhere become in
accordance with the local conditions. Climate, location of towns, height
of mountains, direction of rivers,... have sometimes favored him from
one side, sometimes limited him from another and influenced his phy-
sique as well as his moral behavior. In this way, he has nowhere become
everything, but everywhere become something different.*1
To think that there is one superior cultural model that applies universally is to
neglect these different circumstances. Any attempt to equalize cultures artifi-
cially will lead to "destruction of all individuality," "mediocrity," and "empti-
ness."45 Forster describes cultural pluralism in aesthetic terms: as a bouquet of
different flowers, as a harp with different strings on which many more harmo-
nies can be played than if the strings were all of equal length.46 But more than
Johann Gottfried Herder, who similarly emphasizes cultural pluralism, Forster
stresses the underlying human equality.
According to Forster, all humans have the same "fundamental predisposi-
tions, however different their relative intension and their extensive richness."47
Whatever differences there are between cultures should be explained by refer-
ence to the different circumstances under which they developed. He opposes
racist assumptions about the natural inferiority of non-Europeans:
Reason, feeling, and imagination, united in the most beautiful dance,
are the Graces of life.... Oh, how has anybody dared to accuse nature of
" Georg Forsters Werke, VII, 45.
a Ibid., 51.
" Ibid., 52, 56.
" Ibid., 56.
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denying this beautiful harmony of predispositions to nine-tenths of our
brothers!48 For the point of agreement of all nations lies in the core of
their essence.49
For Forster pluralism does not imply the impossibility of intercultural com-
parisons and assessments. His accounts are filled with evaluative statements and
with comparisons between foreign and European cultures. While he intends to
write without prejudice, he does not mean to abstain from judging: "All peoples
of the earth have equal claims to my good will..., and my praise and blame are
independent of national prejudices."50
The crucial question of course is where the standard for evaluation and
comparison of different cultures comes from. Forster is in effect using two crite-
ria. First, he thinks that one can evaluate different cultures in terms of how far
they have developed, meaning something like the degree of their inner richness
and differentiation. For example, he thinks it is beyond dispute that European
cultures are more highly developed than the culture found on Tierra del Fuego;
but he says that is because the people in that area live under such dire circum-
stances that their entire life is taken up by the struggle for survival, which leaves
them no opportunities for further cultural development.51 He does not wish to
assess cultural development against a fixed moral yardstick or a specific cul-
tural model, but rather, in terms of their relative inner growth and articulation.
Second, Forster assesses cultural practices in moral terms by using their
level of respect for human rights and the moral equality of all human beings as a
standard. He blames cultures if they include practices of slavery, and he praises
them if they let individuals flourish; he blames oppressive practices and praises
practices that allow for diversity and creativity. Thus, he vehemently criticizes
slavery, slave-trade, war, and despotic forms of government, whether in Europe
or elsewhere.
In doing so Forster does not display more methodological sophistication
than one would expect from an anthropologist of his time. He does not ask if his
own evaluative standards might themselves be products of a particular culture.
He does realize, however, that his own perspective colors the way he describes
other cultures. He admits that complete freedom from prejudice is an ideal more
than a reality and that he himself sometimes falls short of it,52 but he describes
his occasional prejudice as the result of a general human weakness, not as the
41 In the writings of many cosmopolitans, one finds a marked tension between their gender-
neutral talk of "humans," on the one hand, and gender specific references such as this one,
leaving the status of women in these cosmopolitan theories quite unclear.
« Ibid., 55.
'" Georg Forsters Werka, II, 13-14.
!l Georg Forsters Werke, VII, 48.
51 Georg Forsters Werke, II, 13.
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result of a particular culturally determined European conception of reason. The
fall force of this last possibility would not be felt until well into the next century.
Cultural cosmopolitanism, insofar as it is based on the essential moral equalitj
of all human beings, implies a form of moral cosmopolitanism. But whereas
moral cosmopolitanism focuses on individuals, cultural cosmopolitanism focus
on the value of collectives (cultures), and because it values cultural pluralis
positively cultural cosmopolitanism has some political implications of its own.
It implies'that states, peoples, and ethnic groups, in their dealings with each
other should value and tolerate cultural differences (provided no basic moral
norms are being violated). Furthermore, cultural cosmopolitanism is compatible
with the formation of an international political order as proposed by interna
tional federative cosmopolitanism, as long as this order is hospitable to and
protective of cultural pluralism. Because cultural cosmopolitanism defends
transcultural moral standard, it can in principle accept a "thin" global political
system that protects human nghts, provided this system is built only a
standard, and not on the particular features of a particular culture.
Market Cosmopolitanism
Although market cosmopolitanism contains a strong political program, it
would be misleading to regard it as a type of political cosmopolitanism, because
its advocates actually seek to diminish the role of politics through a series ,
economic reforms. Market cosmopolitanism is the view that the economic mar-
ket should become a single global sphere of free trade, and that this will promote
world-wide peace while enhancing individual freedom and reducing th
states.
This view emerged with the development of classical economic theory. It
was by no means widely held in eighteenth-century Germany, which should be
no surprise given that mercantilism was the predominant economic theory and
practice there at the time. In part through the dissemination of the work of Adam
Smith however, anti-mercantilist views entered the discussion. In my view th
most pronounced defender of market cosmopolitanism is the long-forgotten
Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch (1746-1812), a prolific historian at the University
of Kiel, who had a wide span of interests. He published two anonymous articles
in the Berlinische Monatsschrift of 1792 in which he discusses and attacks mer-
cantilism. In a 1793 collection of philosophical essays (published tinder his own
name), he adds a third essay.53
» fDietrich Hermann Hegewisch], "Welche von den europaischen Nazionen hat das
Merkantilsystem zuerst vollstândig in Ausübung gebracht?," Berlinische Monatsschnft J>
n7921 401-13' "Über den wahren Grundsatz der Handelsgesetzgebung, und uber die
Vorbereitungsmi'ttel, das Handelsverkehr unter alien Volkem zum moglich "ochsten Grade z
enTetern und zu beleben," BrtMsch, Monatsschnfi, 20 (1792), 502-35 (-ÜwG); Neue
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The central tenet of mercantilism is that the government should strive to
maximize national wealth and power by tariffs and restrictions on the import of
finished products, the promotion of exports, and strong government support of
the national industry. Against this view, Hegewisch argues that it is more advan-
tageous for everyone involved if a state imports those goods that are more ex-
pensive to produce domestically. Moreover, mercantilist protectionism is based
on the false assumption that one's own state will profit if other states are unable
to export their goods. Hegewisch argues that the situation is quite the contrary:
if protectionism were abolished, other states would gain from their exports, reach
a higher standard of living, and become even better trading partners, because it
would allow them to import more, too. England does better when surrounded by
prosperous countries than when surrounded by Siberias, yet the implicit aim of
mercantilism is the production of more Siberias.54
Hegewisch realizes, however, that free trade can lead to significant shifts in
production practices and that initially many people then lose their incomes as
jobs supported by protectionism disappear. His solution to this problem is the
free movement of labor: individuals should have the freedom to migrate, the
freedom to choose their occupation, and they should be educated in such a way
that they acquire multiple skills and are flexible enough to adapt to a changing
job market.
In the world market people would move to where the jobs are. There would
be borders but no thresholds. Over time, this would lead to a situation in which
each country produces those goods that it is naturally best suited for. This would
stimulate commerce between all regions of the world and lead to a higher stan-
dard of living for all human beings. Hegewisch emphasizes the important cos-
mopolitan point that this system works only if all states can and do participate.55
Hegewisch envisions market cosmopolitanism emerging through a process
of gradual economic liberalization, with the state playing an important role dur-
ing the transition period. Against Adam Smith he argues that the state has an
obligation to take care of people who lose their jobs as a result of the initial
changes and that the state should protect them from starvation.56 But after the
new system is fully in place, the importance of national governments diminishes
dramatically. Because the main task of national governments is national defense
and the protection of the livelihood of citizens, their future role will be at most
Betrachtungen fiber den nehmlichen Gegenstand," in Hegewisch, Historische, philosophische.
and literarische Schriften (Hamburg, 1793), 249-56 (=NB). That Hegewisch is the author of
the two anonymous articles I infer from the fact that "Über den wahren Grundsatz" was re-
printed in his Historische, philosophische, und literarische Schriften, and that the other essay





auxiliary. In the ideal world-wide market, war is in no one's interest, and citizens
do not need subsistence guarantees by the government because they simply move
to jobs elsewhere whenever they have to. The freer the global market becomes,
the smaller the role of the state will be. In his enthusiasm at the prospect of a free
world market Hegewisch fails to pay attention to a number of probable side-
effects. He neglects the issue of the psychological and personal costs of migra-
tion on a large scale, the question of the guarantee of a sufficient supply of
living-wage jobs for all world citizens, and the problem of the detrimental effects
of income disparities. He also fails to address the question of whether there
might not be circumstances under which it would be profitable for some states to
be protectionist. Thus, Hegewisch concludes:
As soon as those natural human rights, the right to emigrate and the
right to choose one's occupation freely, are recognized and restored by
the rulers of the peoples; as soon as [coercive regulations regarding land
use, guilds, manufacturing, and trade] are lifted; as soon as the nations
approach one another more than they part ways; as soon as they want to
ground their prosperity more on perfectly friendly interaction than on
isolation; then it will be made much easier for the fathers of the peoples
to care for the preservation of their children, who, at least for the most
part, have long been mature.5'
Market cosmopolitanism contrasts with other forms of cosmopolitanism in
several ways. Because of its advocates' strong belief in the self-regulative ca-
pacity of the market economy and because of their belief that enlightened self-
interest will be enough to realize a free global market, market cosmopolitans
regard as unnecessary all transnational institutions or laws other than the rules
of the market. Market cosmopolitans do presuppose a very thin form of moral
cosmopolitanism, insofar as they consider tolerance important, take all human
beings as equal potential trading partners, and couch their ideal in terms of
"natural human rights." Slavery, for example, means that slaves are denied free-
dom of movement and freedom to choose their occupation, and is thus wrong in
the eyes of market cosmopolitans.
Market cosmopolitanism differs from cultural cosmopolitanism in that its
advocates endorse perpetual mobility. The radical change of productive and eco-
nomic practices that would be brought about by the global market would uproot
communities and destroy their traditional ways. Cultural differences would be
lost insofar as they depend on a habitat or economic system that would now
become obsolete; and insofar as they are portable, they would lose their original
moorings and be mixed in a global potpourri of cultural forms.
"NB, 256; cf. ÜwG, 531.
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But the contrast between market cosmopolitanism and romantic cosmopoli-
tanism is even starker. Whereas market cosmopolitanism reduces humanity to
an aggregate of individuals pursuing their material benefit, the romantics defend
a vision of humanity united in faith and love.
Romantic Cosmopolitanism
The early German romantics criticize the Enlightenment for disregarding
the most essential components of truly human life: love, emotional bonds, beauty,
shared faith, and mutual trust. In their view Wieland's emphasis on reason, re-
form, and the perpetual imperfection of the world, Kant and Fichte's advocacy
of principles and rights, Forster's scientific anthropological approach, and
Hegewisch's defense of a global marketplace of uprooted individuals are all
based on overlooking the most crucial aspects of human existence.
Although their approach makes for a very radical Zeitkritik, the early ro-
mantics are by no means reactionaries.!! They endorse many of the ideals of the
Enlightenment, especially the ideals of individuality, freedom, anti-authori-
tarianism, and equality. But they accuse the Enlightenment philosophers of hav-
ing degraded these very ideals to atomistic individualism, rootlessness, self-
interestedness, and abstract légalisai; and they point to an alternative way of
conceiving of these ideals. The romantics saw themselves as salvaging the core
of Enlightenment ideas while transforming them by bringing out their deeper
meanings.
I have already given one example of early German romantic cosmopolitan-
ism: Friedrich Schlegel's defense of the ideal of a world-wide, non-coercive re-
public of republics. Schlegel evokes a vision of humanity as pure and good, but
his presentation of this ideal is sketchy. Others have done more to develop ro-
mantic cosmopolitanism, especially Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772-
1801). The best example of romantic cosmopolitanism is his Die Christenheit
oder Europa. This is a talk he gave to the romantic circle in Jena (1799). It was
published posthumously and given this title by the editors.59
Novalis evokes an ideal that is to serve as an alternative to the Enlighten-
ment. This ideal is centered on emotion, spirituality, and concrete connectedness
of human beings to each other; and it is meant to replace the focus on rational
knowledge, material goods, and abstract moral and legal principles. Character-
istically romantic is the view that this ideal itself is not the result of a process of
logical reasoning—this being one of the characteristics of the Enlightenment
that are criticized—but of the creative imagination of the poet. In order to com-
M See Frederick Beiser, in his introduction to The Early Political Writings of the German
-Romantics (Cambridge, 1996), xi-xix.
" Novalis, Schriften, eds. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel (Stuttgart, 1960), III.
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municate this ideal of the imagination, then, a romantic poet neither can nor
wants to give an argument. Instead, he evokes the ideal through the use of a
symbol » Novalis here uses the image of the European medieval period, which
he provocatively presents as a golden era to evoke the ideal of its Parousia, the
cosmopolitan ideal of a global spiritual community.
The fact that Novalis uses medieval Europe as a symbol does not mean that
the ideal cosmopolitan future is limited to Europe. Although he sees Europe as
the place where the new era will start, he explicitly expands the scope of the
ideal to cover the whole world: "The other parts of the world wait for Europe's
reconciliation and resurrection to j om with it and become fellow citizens of the
kingdom of heaven."6'
Few historians will recognize the historical Middle Ages in Novalis's de-
scription That is because the empirical entity chosen to serve as symbol for the
romantic ideal is itself transfigured ("romanticized") in the process. Medieval
Christian Europe serves as a symbol for an ideal humanity that is united in faith
and love, but in the process Novalis's Middle Ages become unrecognizable to
the (non-romantic) professional historian. Novalis intentionally confuses the chro-
nology blurs the distinction between the ideal and the real, provocatively elimi-
nates any tensions (e.g., the oppression of Jews and of serfs), and depicts the
Middle Ages in such a way that the era appears maximally beautiful and harmi
nious and maximally different from the Enlightenment.62
In his talk Novalis conjures up a sensual picture of the "beautiful, splendid
times," dunng which all of Europe was united in one common religion and under
one political ruler (the Holy Roman Emperor). Everyone acted on the decrees of
the church, and ordinary people found "protection, respect, and audience" in the
church when they needed it. The churches were full of beauty, music, smells,
and mystery. Politically, Europe was a unity, and the religious and political pow-
ers were in harmony with each other. Peace, faith, beauty, and love united all.63
Yet this idyllic state of affairs could not last. It was the childhood of humanity :
"But humanity was not yet mature, not yet educated enough for this splendid
realm."64 The unavoidable development of humanity disrupted this primal unity.
Novalis's vision of the golden era functions as a contrast against which all
the ills of the present are highlighted. The rise of individualism and market capi-
talism in the early modern period disrupts the community's unity of purpose and
leads to social fragmentation. Individual interests become opposed to the social.
» See Charles Larmore, The Romantic Legacy (New York, 1996).
w Novalis, Schriften, HI, 524.
« On Novalis's idea of the golden era, see Hans-Joachim Màhl, Die Idee des geldenen
Zeilalters im Werk des Novalis: Studiën :ur Wesensbeslimmung der friihmmanüschen Utopie
undzu ihren ideengeschichtlichen Voraussetzungen (Heidelberg, .1965).
" Novalis, Schriften, III, 507.
" Ibid., 509.
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Commercialization and materialism cause people to fail to cultivate their sense
of the transcendent. They use their mental faculties for hedonistic purposes and
for the technological satisfaction of an increasingly complex set of needs. Greedy
human beings have no time for "quiet collection of the mind, the attentive con-
sideration of the inner world."65 The opposition between knowledge and faith
sharpens. The contempt of religion expands to the imagination, feeling, moral-
ity, and the love of art and poetry. Thus, "faith and love" are slowly displaced by
"having and knowing."66
Even what little is left of religion is not left intact: within the church, indi-
vidualism gives rise to Protestantism, which introduces a split within Christian-
ity. Moreover, the emancipation of the state from the church causes the opposi-
tion between religious and political spheres, and in the process, religion gets
locked up inside the boundaries of states, which is the start of a gradual un-
dermining of the "religious cosmopolitan interest" and its peaceful influence.67
Politically, Europe has landed in a state of crisis and continued warfare. For
Novalis, all these evils are facets of one development, namely, of the rupture of
the original ties of love and faith. This leads to social fragmentation, antagonis-
tic egoism, irreligious one-dimensionality, religious schisms, ecclesiastical
territorialism, and continuous warfare. Because Novalis regards all of these as
intimately linked, it would be unduly restrictive to characterize his view, as some
commentators have done, as merely religious68 or as a quietistic philosophy of
history without relevance for political philosophy.69
Novalis expects a renewal before very long. But this renewal cannot come
from more of the same, that is, not from more warfare, more atomistic individu-
alism, more abstract rationality, more commerce. Only a spiritual power can
bring about real change and lead to real peace and a new way for individuals to
relate to each other. The current anarchy is the perfect seedbed for a new reli-
gion: "From the destruction of everything positive it lifts up its glorious head as
the creator of a new world."70 Novalis does not provide a determinate descrip-
tion of the new era. Rather, he intends the symbolic presentation of the romanti-
cized middle ages to enable his audience to transcend the present and to evoke
the cosmopolitan ideal of a global spiritual community.
With the exception of Friedrich Schlegel's version of international federa-
tive cosmopolitanism, early German romantic cosmopolitanism is radically op-
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enment and the beginning of a new era, although early German Romanticism is
not yet reactionary and nationalistic. But under the influence of the French war
efforts this turn came soon. Napoleon's conquests provoked a surge of national-
isms, and the laterromanticism was a leading movement in this respect. Novalis
died in 1801 and so did not experience this change of climate. Schlegel, how-
ever, gave up his ideals of a new religion and a new world, converted to Roman
Catholicism, and served as a conservative Restoration diplomat.
The other cosmopolitan voices died down, too. In the GescMossene Han-
delsstaat (1800) Fichte retracted much of what he had written on cosmopolitan
law, and turned increasingly nationalistic. Wieland withdrew from public life
after 1800. He was hurt by Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, who pub-
licly attacked him for his orientation toward world literature and for alleged
unoriginality, and he was disillusioned by continued European warfare and the
rise of nationalism. Hegewisch focussed on his historical writings. Forster died
in 1794, and Kant died in 1804 after several years of dementia.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a dramatic rise of
nationalism, but there were also waves of cosmopolitanism, which led, for ex-
ample, to the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations,
and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Now that cosmopolitanism
seems on the rise again, the rich variety of cosmopolitan perspectives brought up
in Germany two centuries ago deserves renewed attention both to illuminate the
historical background of cosmopolitanism and to point out the many different
forms cosmopolitanism can take.71
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